A lot of dreams have been invested in the Palestinian constitution. Its ambitious provisions promise a socially progressive, inclusive and tolerant State. Yet, today, these drafts have lost the semantic ambiguity that typically characterises constitutions in the making. It is all too easy to decide that those constitutional words have lost any hint of their politically-induced performative force. It may be tempting to imagine what things may be like had the Oslo Agreements led to a successful constitutional draft; or what could have happened had Arafat not believed that he could somehow artificially turn back the legal clock to a pre-1967 legal patchwork. It is equally tempting to imagine what could -still -happen if, instead of being merely tolerated, perduring customary laws were encouraged to lend their full gravity to a burgeoning civic movement. The sovereignty deficit that plagues the Palestinian constitution-making effort may turn out to be an asset if, by standing in the way of establishing a constitutional democracy from the top down, it has allowed customary practices to flourish.
Introduction
Can words -rather than a state (or army) -constitute a country?
1 They would be words that have taken some knocking about. Seasoned through extensive parleys, stretched by multi-dimensional aspirations, challenged by occupational anger, the words of the Palestinian Constitution are meant to carry the weight of their country. Can they (and should they) carry it all the way towards statehood?
An increasing number of Palestinian voices stress the fact that statehood cannot be, and never was, an end in itself. As a means to promote the rights of all segments of the Palestinian population, statehood is only viable if a certain number of conditions are met. Prominent among them is the state's accountability to the whole of the Palestinian population.
In March 2011, the Palestinian Legislative Council's (PLC) constitutiondrafting committee was asked to`finalise' its work`in accordance with the merit of finalising the independent Palestinian State's establishment' . Yet raising concern about the merit of such`finalising' has not so far dampened the ambition of this constitutional draft.
2 Its endeavour to set the basic legal framework for limiting and organising the powers of the executive, legislature and judiciary (with significantly greater staunchness than other Arab constitutions) 3 is not only an attempt to shape a way of life; its performative language defiantly blazons the very elements that have until now stood in the way of this aspiration. Constitutions do not usually define borders or the rights of its`refugees'; nor do they usually come before statehood.
What can, and what do, constitutions usually constitute? Chalmers suggests a threefold answer to this question, distinguishing between the`epistemological' setting out of`the conditions which enable individuals to have a conception of the political or legal'; the formal identification of the`subjects of the rights and entitlements bestowed by the Constitution'; and the forging of some kind of aspirational identity or so-called`politics of the soul.' 4 As this framework proves helpful as a bid to structure my discussion of the Palestinian constitution-making endeavour, this paper is structured along these three themes, starting with`the sphere of the legal.' . 3 As it stands, the current draft may still be deemed one of the most liberal constitutions in Arab history, not only because of the strength of its rights provisions but also because of the genuine attempt to close many of the loopholes that exist in other Arab constitutions (especially when it comes to emergency powers and the independence of the judiciary). 
The sphere of the legal
Even when considered in a strictly epistemological sense, the claim that constitutions somehow`set out the conditions which enable individuals to have a conception of the political or legal' is problematic. It suggests a transition from some sort of pre-legal, hazy merging of the legal and political to a formally constituted legal sphere that lends itself to a specifically legal framework of analysis (as opposed to its political counterpart). This claim is remarkably akin to that first formulated by Jellinek at the turn of the 20 th century and lends itself to the same objections: any attempt to sort the legal away from the political fabric that conditions and enables it leads to an inability to explain the normative status of law. 5 This inability is in turn paid for by an exposure to either some reductive`legal realism' or convenient reference to an absolute (whether it be God, natural law or otherwise) to ground law's normative claim.
As a particularly daring instance of`building the ship at sea' , the Palestinian construction of the legal sphere could hardly be more foreign in its eclectic pragmatism to the romantic claim that constitutions somehow constitute the sphere of the legal (even if only epistemologically). When, in September 1993, the signing of the first of the Oslo Agreements entrusted the Palestinian leadership with some control over a small territory, the Palestine Liberation Organization's Legal Committee quickly drafted a provisional constitutional document, which was fiercely criticised both externally 6 and internally. 7 As a result, the Palestinian Authority was established before any basic law was issued, hence prompting an enduring difficulty, given the Palestinian Authority's limited representativeness (I develop this issue at length in section 2).
8 It also meant, more importantly, that the emerging Palestinian institutions were left devoid of any clear`non-Oslo' legal 5 In a bid to free legal science from the`vice of methodological syncretism' , Jellinek denounced as illegitimate any amalgam of different methods of cognition, observing:`[i]f one has comprehended the general difference between the jurist's conceptual sphere and the objective sphere of natural processes and events, one will appreciate the inadmissibility of transferring the cognitive method of the latter over to the former.' See G Jellinek, System der subjektiven öffentlichen Rechte (tr S Paulson, in S Paulson, B Litschewski Paulson & M Sherberg, Normativity and Norms: Critical Perspectives on Kelsenian Themes (1998) 28. 6 The draft proclaimed Jerusalem the capital and clearly aimed at the production of a permanent constitution for a sovereign state (this is still very much the case in the current 2003 draft). 7 The hasty drafting lacked any publicity and was unlikely to stand in the way of Presidential authoritarianism. 8 While the PLO purports to represent Palestinians everywhere (this includes 4.7 million United Nations registered refugees), the Palestinian Authority represents the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza.
ground. Arafat's answer to this predicament was bewildering: upon assuming leadership of the Palestinian Authority, he issued a decree purporting to restore the legal status that existed prior to the 1967 Israeli occupation. 9 This meant the restoration of an impossibly eclectic patchwork of British, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli pre-1967 laws. It also implied that all post-1967 Israeli orders were to be deemed no longer valid; a logical conclusion which was not, however, followed in practice (some post-1967 Israeli military orders are still implemented by Palestinian courts on the basis that they have not been specifically repealed). The resulting legal framework has been described as a`salad' , 10 with layer upon layer of concomitant legal regimes whose applicability depends -within Palestine itself -on location, subject matter and nationality. 16 Otherwise known as Urf', Arabic for`that which is known' , this system of customary law extends to a wide number of Arabic countries. Mainly aimed at preventing further damage within the communities of either of the individuals involved in a dispute, it consists in a set of conflict resolution procedures promoting active community involvement. 17 One way of negotiating the various pitfalls of drafting a constitution while under occupation would be for the Palestinian drafters to envisage a transitional constitution whose sunset clause would clearly signal its bridging role towards a process that is more comprehensive and hence does not suffer from the same legitimacy deficit. 18 Geographically, the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements leads some experts (both Palestinian and Israeli) to deem the establishment of a Palestinian state impossible. Politically, the moribund state of the Palestinian National Council leads some to highlight the hazards inherent in the political disenfranchisement of more than half of the Palestinian population.
19`[
A]s the prospect of a genuine -a sovereign and independent -Palestinian state has receded, another discourse has returned, one with much deeper roots in the Palestinian political
The current layers of concomitant legal regimes may not sit well with the positivist idea that all law must originate in a single power source. In fact, it may be considered a healthy reminder of the possibility of taking a broader (and less Westphalian) view of law, built around a diffuse network of legal norms. From this perspective, the Palestinian legal maze could be deemed an incentive to research ways in which the existing system of customary law may provide for and support the grass-roots advocacy of Palestinian rights in a way of which a formal (written) Palestinian constitution may not be capable.
Identifying the subjects of Palestinian rights
Article 2 of the current Basic Law states:`[t]he Palestinian people are the source of all power' . This sounds odd. Are`the people' not, by definition, the source of all power? Without the political might engendered by a group of individuals pondering ways of living together, there could not be any constitution, let alone any law. Political power, understood as the power to (re)shape social interactions in the light of moral or prudential concerns cannot but emanate from the people.
Article 2 goes on to state that the Palestinian people are the source of all power`which shall be exercised through the legislative, executive, and judicial authorities, based on the principle of separation of powers, and in the manner set forth in this Basic Law.' The distinction between the`power' referred to in the first part and the`powers' (legislative, executive and judicial) that ought to remaiǹ separated' contributes to the oddity of this English translation. As it turns out, an`s' after the initial reference to`power' seems to have been lost in translation, 20 which suggests that the drafters probably had in mind something like Article 33 of the Belgian Constitution:`[a]ll powers emanate from the Nation' .
The peculiar formulation of Article 2 may well find its roots in what it was trying to avoid saying, for there is one word -`sovereignty' -whose absence is noteworthy. Most constitutions use the term at one point or another, including imagination than talk of statehood, and much closer to the ideas that inspired the Arab uprisings. It's often forgotten that until the mid-1970's, Palestinians were looking not to establish a state but to achieve``national liberation'' , to restore their rights in the land from which they had been driven -beginning with the right of return. Palestinians rarely talk about statehood, but they often talk about their rights; statehood is viewed, at best, as a means to achieve them' . See A Shatz,`Is Palestine next? ' (2011) Beyond its silent influence on the constitutional draft, the distorting effect of this`sovereignty issue' can also be seen at work at a more insidious level. When it comes to defining what and who constitutes the Palestinian people, its struggle for sovereignty may be seen as a catalyst: religious and cultural differences are meant to retreat (not necessarily successfully) in front of the national liberation campaign.
Who decides who belongs to the Palestinian people and what interests are shared by it? 26 An answer formulated predominantly in terms of ending the occupation is bound to be precarious. 27 An optimistic reading of the ongoing drafting effort would deem the constitution's extensive human rights provisions, as well as its conspicuous concern for safeguarding the rule of law, to point to a genuine move towards a positive and idealist construction of Palestinian . 27 An answer à la Schmitt, inviting a substantivisation of politics and citizenship, which would hence be defined by the sharing of certain physical or moral qualities, is even more dangerous: see generally, for example, C Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (1985) . It is of course more than doubtful whether members of a polity can identify any set of qualities, moral or otherwise, which uncontroversially defines them as a political unity.
aspirations. 28 Far from being settled or reducible to the refugee question, the ongoing delineating of a Palestinian`social spirit' may be the most important byproduct of this constitution-making endeavour.
For a newly formed people to understand wise principles of politics and to follow the basic rules of statecraft the effect would have to become the cause; the social spirit which must be the product of social institutions would have to preside over the setting up of those institutions; men would have to have already become the advent of law that which they become as a result of law. to Sieyès' theory of the nation's pouvoir constituant, Schmitt emphasises that the word`nation' designates the people as a unity capable of political action, with the consciousness of its political specificity and the will to exist politically [...] The theory of the people's pouvoir constituant presupposes the conscious will to exist politically, thus a nation [...] The conscious choice of a certain type and form of this existence, the act through which``the people gives itself a constitution'' thus presupposes the state whose type and form is determined. But for the act itself, for the exercising of this will, there cannot be any procedural rule, no more than for the content of a political decision. Nation willing it will suffice' . See C Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (1928) Ch 8, 79 (my translation).
peal to ethics the inevitable and insignificant product of power struggles that are, as such, reducible to`normative nothingness and concrete disorder.'
32
The task of determining what interests and aspirations are shared by, and constitutive of, a community is always going to be an open-ended endeavour. In a certain (typically Western) understanding of constitutionalism, it is the job of the constitution to preserve this open-endedness through the imposition of limits on divided state powers (these limits are`a way of acknowledging that a people is never directly present to itself as a unity: whoever claims to speak on its behalf may only do so if the claim can be questioned by another power').
33 Yet in some contexts, the strategic (and formalist) drafting of a constitution (whether it be for the purpose of gaining international recognition or otherwise) may well have the opposite effect, stiffening rather than promoting the articulation of socio-ethical aspirations.
Many claim to speak on behalf the Palestinian people. Yet in their present state, Palestinian institutions can hardly be said to foster the connection between political power and its`source' -the Palestinian people (Article 2). The Palestinian National Council (PNC) is the one body 34 that is supposed to represent all segments of the Palestinian population (whether in the Occupied Territories or the diaspora). 35 The PLC (which has not been able to convene in recent years), in contrast, only represents Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories. As the Palestinian Authority's legislative arm, its authority (and raison d'être) stems from the Oslo Agreements.
The move to secure recognition of statehood at the United Nations (UN) Security Council may be seen as the culmination of a process condoning the gradual transfer of power away from the PNC. Established as a short-term administrative entity charged with the limited governance of a restricted territory, 36 the Pales-32`L egally, the sovereign decision is (from a decisionist perspective) neither explained by reference to a norm or to a concrete order, neither inserted in a concrete order; […] The sovereign decision is absolute beginning, and the beginning (also in the sense of arche) is nothing other than a sovereign decision. 35 Because of the high number of Palestinian refugees who are not as yet registered to vote at the PNC elections (these elections have also been criticised for their lack of transparency), representation of those scattered throughout the diaspora is still very patchy. 36 Its five-year mandate was extended in 1998.
tinian Authority has sought to establish all the infrastructure of statehood while still under occupation. Its latest bid to replace the PLO and substitute it with the State of Palestine has been widely criticised as overstepping the mark (aside from being at odds with resolution 43/177). 37 As a subsidiary body, competent only to exercise those powers conferred on it by the Palestinian National Council [...] it does not have the capacity to assume greater powers, to``dissolve'' its parent body.' 38 The greatest peril of this Palestinian Authority-initiated move (even if it has the PLO executive committee's approval), however, lies in its implications for those Palestinians scattered across the globe:
If they are`disenfranchised' and lose their representation in the UN [as a consequence of the PLO's substitution with that of Palestine], it will not only prejudice their entitlement to equal representation, contrary to the will of the General Assembly, but also their ability to vocalise their views, to participate in matters of national governance, including the formation and political identity of the State, and to exercise the right of return. demanding immediate and direct elections to the PNC. 41 Given the huge number of Palestinian refugees who are not currently registered to vote (or registered tout court), the amplitude of the challenge underlying such elections prompts some to highlight that this call for elections cannot be more than a symbolic move aimed at denouncing the legitimacy of the UN bid.
42
One may wish to dispute such skepticism. In her seminal report 43 (instigated by the UN High Commission for Refugees) on refugee participation in`country of origin's political processes' , Katy Long draws on recent instances of`out of country voting' (OCV), including the 2005 and 2010 Iraqi elections, 44 to highlight both their challenges and potential limitations. From a logistical perspective, one of the difficulties is to facilitate affordable 45 travel to and from polling stations in relative safety 46 (postal/online voting may alleviate that difficulty in countries with an adequate infrastructure) and to safeguard the privacy of voters' information.
Aside from these technical hurdles, the most difficult task consists of setting up the criteria determining one's right to vote. Defining these criteria widely, so as to include the wider diaspora (whether they are registered as refugees or not, and encompassing second generation migrants) has clear development benefits (remittances, skills-transfer etc.) and is likely to lead to a more sustainable y facilitating refugee and IDP engagement in political negotiations following conflict, these groups are more likely to understand themselves as stakeholders in the peacebuilding and reconstruction processes. This in turn is likely to lead to more sustainable repatriation and return, as refugees and Internally Displaced Persons are both recognized and recognize and secure peace-building and reconstruction process. 48 Yet the financial costs associated with such a wide enfranchisement of the diaspora can be significant, as illustrated by the Iraqi experience. 49 The electoral law which belatedly enfranchised the Iraqi diaspora in 2005 stipulated eligibility criteria that were very broad`so that estimates of numbers of eligible expatriates included almost anyone who had left the country at any time for any reason' (voter registration totaled only 22 percent of the estimated expatriate population in the 14 countries offering OCV).
50
Even if one were to adopt much more restrictive eligibility criteria, for instance by conditioning eligibility to vote to an`intention to return' (a move which would be very problematic given the continuing expansion of Israeli settlements), 51 the sheer number of Palestinian refugees would create unprecedented difficulties. While the international community should nevertheless be able to rise to the challenge, one may ponder the extent to which, in the present circumstances, PNC elections would empower Palestinians not only to articulate, but also to carry through their yearning for equal rights.
The power to bring about those aspirations would require a reversal of the current dynamic, hence a transfer of power away from the Palestinian Authority towards the PLO, a move that would go against vested Israeli interests. As unlikely as it may be, such an institutional revolution is only conceivable if it stems from grass-roots activism; that is, from the bottom up, rather than from some ambitious`constitutionalist politics' driven by calls for democratic legitimation.
The peril of a constitutionalist strategy that is mainly outward-looking (animated by a desire to build`all the trimmings of a state' in hope of gaining themselves to be equal citizens in their country of origin.' See Long, above n 43, 6. 48 Long, above n 43, 6, quoting J Milner,`Refugees and the Regional Dynamics of Peacebuilding' (2009) 28 Refugee Survey Quarterly 13-30:`The overall security of the peace-building process is also likely to increase, as ensuring refugee and IDP access to civil political space will help to prevent the emergence of so-called``spoiler'' refugee groups whose failure to engage in reconstruction can undermine a post-conflict settlement. international recognition) lies in its alienating from the law-making process the very people it was supposed to empower. If a state is not only triggered by, but remains primarily an answer to, a liberation campaign (rather than a response to the necessity to articulate and coordinate common goals) it is in danger of being reduced to an economic and/or administrative state; a state where the political has been neutralised by legal norms combined with economic welfare and reduced to the mere`technology of administration.' Gandhi's words are increasingly quoted primarily because they denounce any attempt to establish`home rule' from the top-down as delusive: if liberation is assimilated to the mere toppling of external rule and hasty building of a Western-style nation state, then it may not be worth it.`Independence must begin at the bottom. Thus, every village will be a republic or panchayat having full powers.'
57
If there ever was something approaching this ideal of bottom-up, locally grown independence in post-World War I`Palestine' , it was during the early stages of the first intifada. While it may never have managed to be completely non-violent (it took a definite, violent turn during the Kuwait Crisis), 58 the seeds of what may properly be termed`embryonic self-rule' were there nevertheless. In a detailed survey of the legal decision-making structures during the first intifada, Adrien K. Wing outlines the importance of local popular committees:
In the beginning of the intifada, each locality formed various popular committees (lijan sha'biya) which became involved in day-to-day underground governance. By May 1988, there were 45,000 functioning local committees of various types. The local popular committees elected representatives to larger coordinating committees, which in turn established regional ties, and then linked up with the UNLU [Unified National Leadership of the Uprising].
59
As the primary legal institution of the intifada, the UNLU sought to control the use of force and coordinated civil society activities: withholding of taxes, boycott of Israeli products, work stoppages and mass resignations of the police 56 administered urf, public figures came to the fore during the first intifada. 67 Today, customary law continues to play a major role in Palestinian legal culture, even if it has come under pressure to reform. Women's groups denounce how it perpetuates women's social and legal subordination. 68 It has been further alleged that`some customary law judges are illiterate; there are different local versions of customary law and no unified one, and some arbitrators demand emoluments verging on bribery.' 69 Given the strengthening of Islamic movements since the 1970's, it has become overlaid`by a facade of Islamic symbols.' 70 Yet having sustained its authority through four occupations, customary law is still hailed as an example of Palestinian control over Palestinian affairs according to Palestinian custom. Unlike the current Basic Law (and the whole legislative infrastructure that accompanies it), customary law can truly be said to`reign over the hearts of [Palestinian] citizens':
[t]here will never be a good and solid constitution unless the law reigns over the hearts of the citizens; […] How then is it possible to move the hearts of men, and to make them love the fatherland and its laws? Dare I say it? Through children's games; through institutions which seem idle and frivolous to superficial men, but which form cherished habits and invincible attachments. 71 The current constitution-drafting effort is anything but frivolous. Some of its more formal dimension may be captured by Nathan Brown when he writes (without irony):`[t]hroughout the world, constitutions have become one of the most important attributes of sovereignty: new states are almost as likely to issue constitutions as they are to print postage stamps and adopt flags.' 72 Now if the goal is to seek`a past from which we may spring rather than that from which we seem to have derived' , 73 it may be worth delaying the issuance of stamps (and a constitution) and ponder the extent to which the burgeoning civic movements 74 on both sides of the security fence are truly best served by a two-state solution. Some form of federalism, 75 enabling different communities to live alongside each other and sharing at least one geographical region ( Jerusalem -not unlike Brussels today) would arguably have more in common with the regional structure 76 that existed prior to the dismantlement of the Ottoman Empire (and enabled the peaceful coexistence of various religious denominations) than a two-state solution. 77 
Conclusion
Sumud means steadfastness, and it has turned into a strategy: when the imbalance of power is so pronounced, the most important thing to do is to stay put. 78 Years ago, while visiting Jerusalem East, I was invited to a Palestinian house that had been`occupied' a few days before: a group of young Israeli settlers stormed the house at night, a fight ensued, the (Israeli) police were called. As the settlers had managed to occupy roughly half of the house, it was decided that the house should be split in two. I was shown the dividing line separating the part of the house in which its Palestinian owners could still live, while the other part was vigilantly guarded by the Israeli settlers. The Palestinian family could not at any time leave their part of the house empty for fear of losing it altogether. The settlers, I was told, were invoking ownership rights according to Ottoman law. I did not get the chance to talk to the settlers or to check any of those underlying legal claims. I was so struck by the folly of the Israeli police's`solution' and the extent to which it resembled, in its absurdity, Solomon's compromise, for surely splitting the house according to the assault's random result (forcing its inhabitants to live in perpetual fear) undermined the very meaning of a property right?
Yet what surprised me most was the relative impassivity with which the matter was presented (among Palestinians). The dispassionate tone that ruled over the discussions that I witnessed left me with the sense that an inconspicuous peril may well be lurking behind the all too visible, quotidian injustices and humiliation. What if they (Palestinians and Israelis alike) get used to it? Is it the case that events that would otherwise arouse powerful emotions can be sunk into the humdrum by the combined weight of decades of occupation?
A lot of dreams have been invested in the Palestinian constitution. Its ambitious provisions promise a socially progressive, inclusive and tolerant state. Yet today these drafts have lost the semantic ambiguity that typically characterises constitutions in the making. It may be tempting to imagine what things may be like had the Oslo Agreements led to a successful constitutional draft (established prior to the Palestinian Authority's coming into existence); or what could have happened had Arafat not believed that he could somehow artificially turn back the legal clock to a pre-1967 legal patchwork. It is equally tempting to imagine what could -still -happen if, instead of being merely tolerated, perduring customary laws were encouraged to lend their full gravity to the moral sentiments that, against the odds, manage to sustain a burgeoning civic movement; one that is capable of establishing`true home rule' or`Swaraj.'
